1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA		
3	EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY) No. 8:18CV329 COMMISSION,)		
4)		
5	Plaintiff,)		
6	ANDREW DEUSCHLE,)		
7	Plaintiff Intervenor,)		
8	vs.		
	WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC.,)		
9	Defendant.) Omaha, Nebraska Defendant.) August 14, 2020		
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14	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS		
15	BEFORE THE HONORABLE SUSAN M. BAZIS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE		
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20	TRANSCRIBER: Ms. Rogene S. Schroder, RDR, CRR		
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25	Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced with computer.		

1	A	-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S
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1 (At 1:00 p.m. on August 14, 2020; with counsel present 2 telephonically:) 3 THE COURT: All right. We are on the record in 8 --8:18CV329, EEOC versus Werner Enterprises. 4 Will the attorney for the plaintiff please enter their 5 6 appearance for the record. MR. DOTY: Yes, Your Honor. This is Grant Doty for 7 Plaintiff EEOC and also Meredith Berwick is on the line. 8 9 THE COURT: Thank you. 10 And for the intervenor? 11 MR. EAST: Brian East for the intervenor. 12 THE COURT: And for Werner Enterprises. 13 MR. CRAINER: Judge, Brandon Crainer and Elizabeth 14 Culhane for Werner. 15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 16 All right. Now, we are here in regards to a discovery 17 dispute. It is somewhat -- well, it is related to the 18 discovery dispute that we had at the end of April in regards 19 to -- I believe it was the routing comment documents that were 20 lately disclosed and then some issues about searches and terms that were used to do those searches. 21 2.2 So, obviously, the Court issued an order and part of the 23 Court's concern I think back in April is what was being requested. We didn't really know whether that was appropriate 24

or not or reasonable due to EEOC not having the information

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that came in late and what was requested.

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So it is my understanding kind of where we are is that

Werner did supplement discovery, as the Court ordered, that -or at least responded to -- to additional discovery and did
provide the search terms and the databases that were searched
for the discovery that was produced in the spring of 2019
due -- due to the fact of the additional discovery of that -the RCDs.

And then EEOC was going to assess what they had and if the parties needed to meet and confer, and obviously, once EEOC has all of their discovery, then they could determine who they wanted to depose.

And based on the information that the EEOC received from Werner has, I guess, precipitated where we are now and the issues that the EEOC has with the information that was provided by Werner and then is -- is asking based on that for, I guess, certain things. For example, to expand search terms and things of that nature.

So, I guess it would be my thought probably the best way to do that is to start with the EEOC's issues. I know Werner has some issues as well, some discovery issues, and we'll do those after we do the EEOC's but to go through the EEOC's statement that was sent to the Court and just address them as they are and, of course, I've read each party's statements.

So, starting with -- I'm on page 2 of the EEOC's document

which indicates the remaining unresolved issues and proposed remedy. So issue number one really comes down to, as I understand the plaintiff's argument, that there were three search terms that were used, that you within your complaint obviously have challenged the policies and practices of Werner Enterprises and, therefore, believe that additional search terms should have been used initially, and you're asking that those be used now.

One question I have -- and I don't know if I've asked this in the last hearing we had but before we go any farther, it at least makes some sense to me that initially before Werner did anything that there would have been a conversation between the parties as to the type of databases that Werner has, which ones they plan to search, why they want to -- why they feel that's where the majority of documents would be and then a discussion between the parties and an agreement on search terms, but I'm assume -- I don't want to assume but I'm assuming that didn't happen because if it did, I'm not sure we would be here. I think we would have been here on that issue.

So, Mr. Doty, did any of those conversations ever take place?

MR. DOTY: I'm sorry, you broke up there.

THE COURT: Sorry.

MR. DOTY: I (static noise) did any of those --

THE COURT: Sorry. Go ahead.

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MR. DOTY: So as you -- as you know, Your Honor, I --
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      I -- Miss Emily Keatley started this lawsuit, and she's now
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      left the EEOC so I -- I can't represent what --
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                THE COURT: Okay.
                MR. DOTY: -- she may or may not have discussed.
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      I -- I don't believe that there was a discussion where specific
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      search terms were required.
           I know our request for ESI search had three very detailed
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      pages of types of data and metadata that would be requested,
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      but I did not see anything on search terms or -- or databases.
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                THE COURT: Mr. Crainer or Culhane, did any of those
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      conversations ever take place to your knowledge?
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                MR. CRAINER: Judge, no, we did not have a
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      conversation before we did our search in discovery.
                THE COURT: Okay. All right. Just -- just wanted to
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      know that.
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           All right. So, Mr. Doty, as to -- and the reasons why you
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      want those additional search terms are provided in -- in
      paragraph labeled number 1 under heading C of your --
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                MR. DOTY: Yes, Judge.
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                THE COURT: -- statement.
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           Is there anything else you want to add in regards to that?
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                MR. DOTY: No. I mean, I -- I think, you know,
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      they -- Werner did respond to your order 140 from that April
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      conference that we had which they then revealed the search
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1 terms and we had no idea that they were as narrow as they were, 2 and -- and -- and reading the -- the -- their position 3 statement, you know, they I think mischaracterizes very narrowly as a lawsuit just regarding Mr. Robinson and 4 Mr. Deuschle and this case certainly goes beyond that.

And -- and we -- we think that those search terms as well as a search -- and the next one are somewhat related. Searches of additional databases would have been expected and -- and would have produced documents.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Crainer, do you want to respond? And, obviously, I've --

MR. CRAINER: Sure.

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THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. CRAINER: Yes, yes. Thank you, Your Honor. regard to focusing just here on -- on number 1 here and -- and the scope of the search, I -- I don't think that Mr. Doty's characterization of what we searched is -- is accurate in the letter and also in this paragraph.

When the applicants interact with Werner, their interaction -- their interaction is housed with Werner's -- in Werner's recruiting database for emails and we searched the recruiting base consistent with the search capabilities of our internal system.

We have a recruiting application that allows us to search by their social security number or their name, and we conducted a search by either of those two search terms, and we cannot otherwise search the database. And we were able to produce and we did produce everything from that database for each of the drivers.

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We also searched -- in addition to -- to just the recruiting database, we also searched the emails and we searched using the name and email of -- of Deuschle and the name of -- Mr. Deuschle and the name of Mr. Robinson.

After -- after we searched those, we -- we were able to produce the information that we were able to find with those searches. You know, a lot of -- of what's being contested here in -- with -- with regard to paragraph one here is that there aren't these general search terms being used. Well, in our databases, our databases don't permit searches like that.

It's -- it's (indiscernible) on the search capabilities.

And then also for searching other information, not every request requires an ESI search and not every place with storage is capable of an ESI search. For example, request number 18 that is addressed here, it asks if we have any documents related to a hearing standard, and we identified what our hearing standard was and responded we don't otherwise have any documents of a hearing standard. We don't -- there's -- there's -- there's no ESI search that needs to be done.

When there are other requests that are being asked of Werner such as provide copies of your handbook, provide

personnel policies, provide simulator training documents, those are known documents that we can ascertain and we know the location and you go in there and you find where that document is and you extract that document and you produce it in the case.

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You don't need to engage into an ESI search to -- to find those documents. We don't have to search hearing exemption or FMCSA exemption, sign language to get a lot of the documents that are being asked for in their request of production.

With the discussion that we've had with counsel over the past couple months about additional searching, we agreed that we would -- or at least we offered to do additional -- additional searching. We searched another database, the HR identity database in this case, that just produced two lines of data that state these are applicants that applied here and they're now -- well, it doesn't state that. It just states that they've been registered into the system, and -- and we've -- we've gone forward and -- and offered some additional search terms that we're willing to do that our system is capable of doing.

Of course, we haven't had any further discussion in response to that last email that I had sent on July 17th. So what we've -- we've done what -- what we're able to do with the -- the searching that we have.

And what's important, I think, to note is that a lot of

these terms, there's, I don't know, 15 or so terms that -- that are being suggested, and I don't see how there's any relation to the audit trail data and why these terms are being suggested based on what the audit trail data reveals.

The -- the whole thing that started this dispute, Judge, goes back to the audit trail data.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. CRAINER: And -- and that is, you know, listed pages of information that shows the -- electronic fingerprints I think is how it's been described in court -- the electronic fingerprints that show people accessing an application and it provides limited comments and information about the -- the applicants.

None of these terms that are suggested down here were revealed in the audit trail data so that doesn't mean we'll -- you know, once we got this audit trail data we saw all these terms being used and now we need to search these elsewhere.

None of these comes out of there: cochlear implant, death waiver, FMCSA exemption.

So I'm not seeing how there's been any explanation from the EEOC as to why these additional searches need to be done based on the audit trail data. That's why we're here. It's solely because of the audit trail data, and if the audit trail data is being used as a springboard for doing more discovery, there has to be some type of relation there and that showing

just hasn't been made, Judge.

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3 THE COURT: Well, here's --

MR. CRAINER: -- (indiscernible) --

THE COURT: -- here's the -- here's -- here's the issue and then I'll let the -- you can respond and then I'll let the plaintiff respond because I want to make sure that we're all on the same page.

I realize this all started with the audit trail data, but what that showed was and what the question was and what the concern was from the plaintiff is that you did not do an appropriate search for relevant documents, and this is what brought that to their attention.

And it is that issue that gets you into the 30(b)(6) of taking a deposition of somebody as to what you did and how you did it and those sorts of things. And so when we had that April hearing, they wanted me to order Werner to do a bunch of things and to take a 30(b)(6) in regards to that and enter an order, which I don't have in front of me right this second, but to order Werner to do a lot of things in order to determine whether you had produced the documents that you were required to produce in discovery.

And I, on the other hand, because I did not -- because of the cost that it could be to do that, at that time it was unclear because I didn't know what the search terms were

whether Werner had searched and done what was required based on the previous questions of discovery as well as the complaint in this particular case.

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So the audit trail data got us to our last hearing but then I've been, for lack of a better word, doing it in pieces rather than just ordering everything because at that point I could not tell or did I know for sure until what was produced in the additional discovery that was requested whether what needed to be produced was produced based on Werner's search.

What we have now is that what Werner did is they searched basically the defendant's name and an email address. That's it. There was nothing else in regards to hearing, hard of hearing, loss of hearing, et cetera which clearly this case goes to Werner's policies and practices regarding hearing-impaired truck drivers.

So I appreciate that, yeah, it was the additional discovery of this audit trail data, but to say that we're limited to that is not where we are is my recollection of what -- what I ordered because I'm doing it in pieces because I didn't know what there was or what would be appropriate to order Werner to do because we didn't have that information which we now do, and that's why I think we're having these discussions.

So, Mr. Crainer, do you dispute or want to clarify that that's really the issue -- the issues that came out of the

April 2020 hearing that we had or telephone conference that we had?

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MR. CRAINER: Sure. Well, as -- as -- as I understand it, we -- from that conference -- after that conference it was -- it was decided that we would reveal the search terms that were used which we did. We sent a letter to counsel, they disagreed that we gave enough information so we sent another letter to counsel identifying the terms that were used, identifying the search capabilities of the system and why we searched what we searched, and then also why we didn't necessarily need to use ESI to search for -- for other information.

So that was one part of what came out of that hearing, and then the second part that came out of it was they had asked -- served discovery requests on what information was contained in the audit trail data.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. CRAINER: They served interrogatories and they served requests for production in both -- both cases. They asked about -- about -- there's -- there's 328 lines in Robinson they asked about and asked us to explain what that is and there are 48 lines in Deuschle's audit trail data that they asked about.

We responded to each line item and stated whether there are any documents for each line item. In every instance where

there was a document, we produced that document and we cited the Bates stamp where it was produced because it had already -- it had already been produced in the case.

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So the -- the documents that are being referenced in that audit trail data, we already explained through their production and were able to cite where those were. In instances where there was no document or nothing to search or nothing to find from the audit trail data, we -- we explained what that was.

I know the EEOC takes -- takes issue with some of the terminology that's used in the audit trail data like item and message and, unfortunately, that's -- that doesn't refer to an actual document. This is an application that was created by Werner's IT department several years ago. The programmers chose to designate certain categories and actions as -- as they saw fit, and we explained that in our discovery responses why there aren't any other documents to -- to produce, much less search for because it's not referencing a -- a specific document.

I know later on the EEOC takes issue that it's not under oath but of course, it was an RFP so it -- it wasn't done under oath. If there's an interrogatory, we would certainly give the exact same response.

So what -- what came out of -- of -- of that conference is those two tracks; disclosing to them the search terms that were done and disclosing where we got certain information and why

ESI didn't have to be done because we knew where the certain target information was; and then also we searched -- we -- we responded to the written discovery requests.

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So that's -- that's my understanding of where we're at and -- and -- and how we've come to, I guess, the -- the -- the current situation, and I'm not -- where -- where my disagreement lies with doing these additional terms, searching these additional terms is that what request or production specifically -- where has it been explained what request requires these additional searches and what the EEOC believes is missing or believes should have been searched based on -- on what's been disclosed, and -- and -- and I don't think that's been established, Judge.

THE COURT: Well, can you explain -- and I realize you didn't start this case -- is there some reason that some of these terms weren't searched when this is what this case is all about?

MR. CRAINER: Sure. Judge, with -- so with regard to the applications, the -- the recruiting application that we have, it's -- it's just limited in how we can search. We can't search a -- a -- a term like deaf or hard of hearing in there. So that's -- that's one reason.

And as for other requests, requests that ask for our handbooks that -- you know, provide us all handbooks that you have that apply to drivers. Well, we didn't do a search for,

you know, all -- all the policies are -- that are contained in that handbook because we know where that handbook is so we went and we grabbed the handbook from 2015, '16, '17, '18 and -- and we produced them so there wouldn't be a need to do a search.

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So that's why some of these search terms aren't necessary, if any of them, because it's not -- it -- the request didn't ask for those documents that required us to do an ESI.

THE COURT: Well, just looking at number 1 -- and I agree. I mean, if you have a handbook, you know where to go and find that. You don't need to necessarily do an ESI search for that. I get that. But even within number 1, one of what they have requested is all documents concerning the hiring, training, employing and/or safety of drivers who are deaf, hard of hearing and/or possess a hearing exemption, and it's saying all documents.

So hypothetically you could have whatever your policy is in regards to that, but then are there emails or anything else in regards to people who are hard of hearing or situations -- I'm just using that as an example. So it would seem to me hypothetically that within the email database that that -- that those terms maybe should be searched. Thoughts, comments?

MR. CRAINER: Judge, on -- on that I -- what we've done in producing our responses, we -- we produced all the -- the documents that we believed to be relevant to that, all documents concerning hiring and training, and then when you're

looking at some of these terms, Werner has over -- as of 2018 12,400 employees. The search of the emails is -- is a global search of all emails, and if -- if we search a term like deaf or hard of hearing or hearing, the amount of results that are likely to come up, I -- I -- I just think would -- would be an astronomical number and then --

THE COURT: Why --

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MR. CRAINER: -- in terms of (indiscernible) --

THE COURT: Let me ask you that. Why do you say that? Because hard of hearing or deaf, as I understand it, you don't have any drivers who are deaf. I don't know if you have any that are hard of hearing. I don't know that you have any employees that are so I guess I -- I'm not sure there would be thousands of emails. I don't know.

MR. CRAINER: Well, Judge, we -- we do and we've disclosed in this case we do have drivers that are hard of hearing. We -- we've recently disclosed another one or at least that has an exemption and -- and we also have non-driving employees that have some form of -- of hearing disability so I know those certainly exist.

You know, one -- one of the things that's targeted here is -- is asking about FMCSA exemptions and -- and how Werner -- what documents that Werner has regarding applicants that have an FMCSA exemption and how that's been handled and addressed.

Well, in this case the EEOC and Intervenor asked us to

search a list of 4- to 500 names -- actually -- well, I think it might have been up to 700, but we've searched several hundred names of people that are on the FMCSA exemption list. So we went through and instead of just searching FMCSA or exemption or waiver, we asked can you give us the names of everyone on that list.

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We then searched everyone on that list and then we produced all the documents from people that had applied to Werner that we were able to find in our system. So there's — there's other ways of going around that information and — and we've gone and done that for the EEOC and intervenor and produced that information.

THE COURT: Okay. And tell me -- and before I get back to the plaintiff -- what -- so for example in the recruiting database, as I understand what you're saying is it's very limited as to what searches you can do. Is that what you're saying?

MR. CRAINER: Correct. There's -- there's two ways to do it. You can search by social security number and -- and name.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, and while we're on this subject, because one of the other things that the EEOC is asking is for Werner to identify all of their databases and they may have said by name but it makes sense in what you -- Werner has said is that we give you the name and you're not

going to know what that means, but it sounds like you have different databases for different things such as recruiting or safety or email, whatever, and that -- so if -- I -- I guess my question is -- and I get it.

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If -- if I'm going to order -- order that you don't have to do anything else, then why do you need to give the databases. I get that. But if we -- but if I am going to rule and say they get something, what is the issue with identifying the databases because as you've said it does not make sense to search 400 or I think you said you had -- in your submission like 400 databases, and it doesn't seem to me that there's going to be anything in, you know, account receivables, if that's a database. There's not going to be anything in that in relationship to this case potentially.

So in order to ease and to make sure and I guess for EEOC's understanding of what you've searched and which databases you've searched and -- I mean, unless they know the databases, they don't -- you don't know or they could not question whether the information they're looking for is somewhere other than what you have searched.

So that's my que- -- so that's my other question to you as to listing the databases.

MR. CRAINER: Sure. So there -- there's a -- there's a couple things to that, Judge. First, we've -- we've represented to them that these drivers had limited interaction

as just applicants. They never got past the applicant stage.

And we've said their interaction would have been in the recruiting database.

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We said the other application -- or the other databases would be the HR identity database which that literally just is an internal thing that shows that they had been added to the system, that the driver name is added to the system. There's just two simple lines.

We -- and then we've offered to similarly search the safety database and -- and that would be -- potentially be one of the other database because there was a safety -- there's an individual, Jaime Maus, that works for Werner that was involved with one of the cases so we agreed, okay, we would search the -- the safety database.

Giving a list of all the databases, as -- as -- as you recognize, they wouldn't even be able to -- to tell the name from some of them because some of the names are a couple letters, an abbreviation, that it's not clear from it -- you know, recruiting is quite clear but other ones don't have such a clear description of what the database is. So that would then require us -- which I don't think is required under the rules -- to then create a document that goes through each of these databases and defines then or describes what the database is, and I don't think that's necessary.

And -- and, again, the stated need for why they need the

database is so they can develop search terms, but as we've seen here at the end of number 1, there's, I don't know, around 15 to 20 search terms that they were able to identify, they've previously been able to identify search terms in our correspondence as of the last couple months, and -- and I -- I don't think that they need the databases to start coming up with search terms.

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If there's an interrogatory that they ask that said, you know, where -- where are these databases or what databases would -- would contain information that would be held if you have an applicant, we're able to answer that and we can answer it's the HR identity, it's the recruiting database. Those would have been the databases. I -- I don't think we need to get into the other databases.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Doty, you want to respond?

MR. DOTY: Yeah, there's a few things I'd like to
respond to. On the last point that Mr. Crainer made which is
they offered to look in the safety database because of this
particular person, Miss Jaime Maus, who we deposed both as an
individual and as part of the 30(b)(6), and we would like to -you know, to redepose her.

Their offer to search the database was limited to a single term and that is the social security number, singular, just the social security number of those two people. And we do know that Miss Maus did what -- what I think Werner has

characterized as the interactive process with Mr. Robinson when Mr. Robinson applied and sought to be employed and they said, well, we want to see if we can train you and had a -- had a meeting with them.

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If you think about just -- they're not even willing to search Mr. Deuschle and Mr. Robinson's name within that safety database or hearing within the safety database. They're willing to search, you know, the social security number.

And I just think if you just sort of listen to this discussion, you know, which has now been going on for 30 minutes, this is the problem that we've had in our -- our -- our discussions with -- with -- with Werner to try to reach an agreement on this.

We -- we do not take Mr. Crainer or in the last conference Miss Culhane's assertions regarding what can or can't be done with these databases like, you know, these terms can't be searched, we can only do names and social security numbers, we do not take those unquestionably and -- and we don't think the Court should either.

You know, they've represented other things regarding
the -- the -- the routing -- the routing slip which we've now
learned are not true. And I'm not saying that Miss Culhane -Miss Culhane and -- and Mr. Crainer are -- are lying to us, but
they're just not the people who can answer these questions.

And our reason for wanting to know the databases is all

along so that we don't have to search 400 databases. I mean, you know, Mr. East was on -- on this conversation where we said, well, just tell us the databases so that we don't have to search 400. We don't need to search your inventory of trucks or your income or your -- you know, your budget issues.

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We just want to know which ones might be implicated so that we can ask -- search these, say, 15 terms that we have listed in number 1 in a way that's very focused, and -- and -- and we've -- we've identified a couple here.

I mean, we now think safety's probably something that should have been searched and hasn't been. Training should have been searched but -- but -- but hasn't been. And we now know that there's the -- the legal database, the -- the in-house legal counsel which I know is one of our subsequent issues.

And that's the only reason we want to know these databases is so that we can say to them, you're right, we don't need -we don't need to search 380 of them but we do want to search
these 20 because they're implicated, and I think their failure
to provide those -- that thing is -- is -- is -- really it
harms them because I think the correct order in the absence of
them identifying what those 400 are is a order from you saying
then search all of them. Fine, if you're not going to tell us
what they are, then you just search all of these databases for
all of these very relevant terms that are relevant for the

EEOC's lawsuit. So that's our -- that's our position.

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THE COURT: All right. And, Mr. Doty, back to one of the questions that I asked the EEOC which has to do -- obviously, this all started with the production of the audit trail data that occurred and the -- the phone conversation that we had in April, but it is -- is it your recollection that what I did is instead of doing what you asked me to do and order everything you wanted, I did it in stages and we needed to know the search terms because we didn't know -- 'cause it was possible if they searched everything, then there isn't anything else and there wasn't anything else to do.

MR. DOTY: That's correct. No, we -- we see this really -- and why -- the way we characterized this, we only want what we are entitled to and asked for back in March of 2019.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DOTY: And -- and we didn't learn that -- the inadequacy of that particular search until your order --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. DOTY: -- in April which ordered them to produce their search terms, and now we've realized how inadequate they were and we should have got those. And for this court to make an -- a reasonable decision on the merits, we need to have the facts and we -- we now -- we now know we don't have those facts because of what we think was an inadequate ESI search by -- by

Werner.

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THE COURT: All right. Before I get to the search terms on number 1, on the end of number 2, it looks like what you're asking is that they should be ordered to do an ESI search of other databases where documents regarding training, employing and/or safety as well as documents about drivers who are deaf, hard of hearing and exemptions may reside.

Does anybody want to say anything on that? I don't know that we talked about that specifically.

MR. CRAINER: Judge, well, with -- with regard to doing a keyword search, the -- the -- the databases aren't capable of doing keyword searches. So (inaudible) --

THE COURT: So how do you find anything in the databases then? How do you find something then?

MR. CRAINER: It's -- it's -- it's stored using their social security number or their name. And going back to the safety database discussion, we offered either name or social security but that's because that's what it's limited to. These databases are -- are -- are limited in their searching capability.

THE COURT: Well, so let me ask you --

MR. CRAINER: They're not --

THE COURT: Hold -- hold on. So let me ask you a question. So obviously you're being sued, you're being sued about policies and practices dealing with -- I mean, obviously,

these drivers but then your policy and practice in general on how you deal with people who are hard of hearing and deaf.

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So let's say hypothetically you have the recruiting database which would provide information as to individuals who maybe had applied who were deaf, hard of hearing and you didn't hire them, and maybe that's all the information that's -- that's in there, but clearly they would be entitled to that information in regards to this case in order to see how you're handling the hiring or not hiring of people with -- as truck drivers who have hearing impairment issues.

So it does not seem to me that you can just say we can't search it because they're entitled to that information and you have an obligation to provide it. So how do you get it then?

MR. CRAINER: Judge, it's -- it's doing a different search that we did by searching the names of FMCSA exemption holders and -- and that's what we produced.

So if you're looking for documents about the hiring and firing of -- of -- of drivers that are deaf or have a hearing exemption, we did that search by extracting the list that -- a list was provided to us from the Federal Register that identified all the exemption holders.

And be- -- because our system is limited, we said, okay, if you give us that list, we'll search the names. And we searched names and then we produced all those documents that showed if there were -- if they applied and if -- if it was

accepted or denied, and we -- we were able to give the information in that way. So they -- the EEOC and the intervenor have that information.

And then with regard to the -- the policies, we produced the hiring guidelines that we have. We produced several versions --

THE COURT: Sure.

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MR. CRAINER: -- of hiring guidelines. Those -- those, in fact, were even used during depositions so we've -- we've given those documents over already.

MR. DOTY: Your Honor, just -- I -- I believe

Mr. Crainer is only talking about the recruiting database and
the ability to search the names and social security numbers

'cause we have discussed in our conferences about searching
other terms in other databases, and they're not so limited.

And, again, the Court should not take Mr. Crainer's representations here. Again, I absolutely a hundred percent believe -- and -- and -- and to the extent that this Court has a question about it, I believe the 30(b)(6) deposition can go -- can address this issue and we can ask the tech -- the technological people whether or not a term such as deaf exemption can be searched in other databases. I -- I -- I'd absolutely be shocked if the answer was no. I mean, this is -- this is -- this is 2020.

And I -- and I hope, you know, that Mr. Crainer's

representation about the recruiting database which may have -because it's about individuals and the search of those
individuals' social security and names is not the same thing
for the safety database, and it's not the same thing for the
training database, and it's not the same thing for the legal
database.

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I mean, you tell me the people in the -- the in-house legal counsel can only search for documents by social security and name. That's just not true. Absolutely patently false.

THE COURT: Mr. Crainer -- and obviously, I had referenced the -- the recruiting database. What about the other databases? I mean, are you -- 'cause it -- you seem to imply that some are limited and I don't know if others aren't but...

MR. CRAINER: Sure, Judge. As -- as an initial matter, I -- I take exception to the fact that the integrity of -- of both myself and -- and Miss Culhane are being challenged here and -- and for some reason that we've been untruthful in this case which certainly is -- is -- is not the case whatsoever.

With regard to the -- the databases, there -- so Mr. Doty is -- is -- is identifying databases that don't exist. And in talking about databases and search capabilities, we -- with regard to the recruiting database, the -- the safety database and the state of the -- the other 400 databases, those are --

are -- are limited in -- in what can be searched.

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With regard to where other documents are -- are obtained, you know, when we're looking and grabbing handbooks and we're getting those from our legal counsel, she's getting those from -- from her file folder so that's -- that's where that information's being obtained. It's the benefits information. That's -- that's how that information's being obtained.

There's -- I don't see the need for doing an ESI search for those when we're -- we're already obtaining those documents and producing those documents.

THE COURT: Well, and here's what I would say. I don't -- I mean, if they're asking for a handbook and you've produced that handbook, I'm not concerned with you going in and doing an ESI search for that unless -- I mean, Mr. Doty, do you find that to be necessary for some reason?

MR. DOTY: No. No. When we ask for a specific document, that's -- that is correct. But when we say we want all documents regarding hearing, they can't just produce a -- a statement that says see this Federal Register entry. We expect a search.

THE COURT: Well, and so it appears to the Court and as Mr. Doty has stated, we're dealing with the request for discovery that occurred in March of 2019 and what was requested. That based on the nature of this suit and those requested, the -- the search terms that Werner has used were

not sufficient so additional search terms need to be done.

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My -- So -- and -- and I'll be honest, I don't know that these -- that the parties can agree. I do not think that -- I'm going to say two things so just sit tight. That the -- the request of EEOC and what they were requesting for those search terms I do not think are out of line.

My only concern is it sounds like some of these databases are, for lack of a better word, I'm going to say old because I do think we're in 2020. It's a little hard for me to imagine that they can't be searched in some way but maybe it's limited and it's based on the way that it was done and -- and it just hasn't been updated. I don't know.

So having said that, you know, for example, when you do search terms and trying to have dashes, sometimes that doesn't work, etc. So I -- I -- I do think there needs to be some communication as to what the databases capabilities are which get me back to whether a 30(b)(6) with the people that can answer questions about the databases and what can be searched and what cannot be searched should be done prior to the searches being done.

So I want you all to think about that because we need to think how -- how to time frame this. So I think additional search terms need to be done. I do think -- and -- and that kind of goes to number 2 'cause that talks about the databases regarding other documents so -- and -- and there may be -- and

I don't disagree that there may be other databases to be searched but here's where we are.

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I don't know what they are. And I realize Werner doesn't see the need for it, but it is as Mr. Doty just stated. I'm going to order you to search the databases with these additional terms, and if the plaintiffs don't know what the databases are, then everything's going to have to be searched which makes no sense, to be quite honest, so it seems to me that Werner needs to identify the databases, the type of documents that are within that database so then EEO- -- that the plaintiff can indicate which databases they think need to be searched for those documents.

Obviously, if there's an argument about that, then I'm going to hear from you and we'll talk again in regards to that, but that at this point in this litigation is the only way to determine whether the appropriate databases have been searched in regards to the search terms necessary to find the documents that the plaintiffs are entitled to based on their requests for discovery.

MR. DOTY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So I think that takes care of 1, 2 and 3.

Four has to do with in-house counsel's electronic file.

I'll be honest with you. I'm not -- I could not exactly follow this. I'm not sure -- so I need EEOC -- I know that there

are -- that there were some requests and that's a response.

So I guess, Mr. Doty, can you explain this a little bit more to me and exactly what you want and why you want it.

MR. DOTY: Yes, Your Honor.

So in the letter that Mr. Crainer sent us on June 1st, and that is Exhibit 3 to what we sent you --

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

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MR. DOTY: -- and that lists all of the database and search terms that they give, they do identify a -- a number of (indiscernible) --

THE COURT: In-house files?

MR. DOTY: Right. In the location column that they found the documents in the in-house counsel file. So it's our -- our -- our understanding and belief that when these two charging parties filed a claim with the EEOC that legal counsel goes and collects all the documents that are relevant here and -- and puts -- and then move -- either -- either moves them or copies them to the in-house counsel file.

And so we think that is a -- a -- a very simple way to get documents to which we are entitled. We're not seeking privileged documents but we also don't believe that the mere residing on the in-house counsel file makes a document privileged, and so we think -- you know, this case is -- these cases are old, and we think that the -- the timeliness of the charge and the fact that in-house counsel would have collected this information and put it in their in-house counsel file

is -- is something the Court should order them to do. 1 2 Search and then when -- when any of these documents come up, you know, either produce them 'cause they're not privileged 3 or make a privilege log on why they can't produce them. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Crainer. 5 6 MR. DOTY: So (inaudible). 7 THE COURT: Sorry. Oh, I'm sorry, Mr. Doty. Are you 8 not -- sorry. 9 MR. DOTY: No, no, I -- I'm done. No, I'm done, Your 10 Honor. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Crainer. 12 MR. CRAINER: Judge, I'm -- I'm not entirely sure on 1.3 what Mr. Doty is asking for us to search and -- and what needs to be searched in in-house counsel's file. One -- you know, 14 15 one of the things that they asked for was all -- you know, the 16 communication with the EEOC so we -- we produced that 17 information. You know, they've asked about, you know, what our position 18 statement was and we produced that so I -- I'm not clear on 19 20 what we need to search in our in-house counsel's file. 21 MR. DOTY: The same --2.2 THE COURT: Well --23 MR. DOTY: The same -- the same terms. The same 24 terms that we're seeking: deaf, hard of hearing, hearing 25 exemption. I mean, EEOC -- EEOC raised this issue of the need

for -- for Werner to train deaf drivers to comply with the ADA.

That was raised -- I mean -- I mean, it was raised during the investigation and conciliation so we believe those documents probably do reside there.

We're not asking them to make extra documents. We just think this is -- that this is a collection place where they've put them and -- and that they should be -- search the exact same terms.

THE COURT: Well, but --

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MR. DOTY: (Indiscernible.)

THE COURT: Hold on, hold on, hold on. What you originally asked for was just them to search the term of Deuschle and Robinson -- I don't know if I'm saying that right, Deuschle -- but Deuschle and Robinson, and they -- because what you were asking for or the reference to in-house counsel's electronic file is all documents that refer to the EEOC charge of Deuschle and then Robinson so -- for an example, and then it says, you know, see May 6th letter and additionally Werner's in-house counsel's electronic file.

So I guess first -- so it seems -- because here's -here's the situation. It is in-house counsel. I completely
understand that does not make everything privilege, but if
you're going outside the two defendants in this case for
in-house counsel, then I think we're in a different area, and
this court is not comfortable ordering a blanket, oh, just

search deaf and you can get everything out of in-house counsel on anything he or she has ever done. That's a different issue than -- than they've indicated these are where the documents are.

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And then I guess my one question to Werner is in your response it says: See May 6th letter and additionally Werner's in-house counsel files, and -- and, obviously, that's the location where those came from. So I'm assuming you were just listing this is where we found this information, not, oh, we've produced this whole file to you already, right? Or...

MR. CRAINER: Exactly, Judge. And -- and they asked for where the location was where we got it and that's exactly where we were able to obtain the information from.

THE COURT: So to clarify from EEOC, for this issue, are you at this point just looking for the Court to order a search for -- in in-house counsel of the term Deuschle and Robinson and not all of the other search terms that we previously talked about?

MR. DOTY: Well, we -- we were thinking -- we were thinking all -- all of the terms. And our -- yeah, and our -- and our position has been that their complaint is that it's a wide search to search these other databases, and our view was one way to help narrow it down, in addition to doing maybe training and the safety database, is -- is also search the in-house counsel database and see what documents come out

1 because the assumption is, is that these documents may have 2 been collected so that -- it was our attempt to make the search 3 less burdensome. THE COURT: Well, that -- that may be in the end, but 4 let me ask a question of Werner. Do you know if the search for 5 Robinson and Deuschle have been done as to in-house counsel and 6 7 whatever documents that are not privileged have been disclosed and those that are privileged that a privilege log has been 8 9 done? 10 MR. CRAINER: Yes, Judge, certainly. That -- that --11 that is the case. And, you know, in-house counsel has 12 whatever -- however she -- she -- she's kept her file on -- on 1.3 each one for Robinson and -- and Deuschle and we've produced 14 those documents and any documents that weren't produced were 15 noted on a privilege log. 16 MS. CULHANE: And, obviously, Judge, with the 17 exception that communications that we have had with in-house 18 counsel since this lawsuit started are not included on the 19 privilege log. 20 THE COURT: Right. 21 MS. CULHANE: (Indiscernible.) 2.2 THE COURT: And has EEOC gotten a privilege log from 23 Werner? 24 MR. CRAINER: Yes. 25 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DOTY: Have we? Okay.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. DOTY: I -- I -- I'm not sure. I mean, I -- I'll have to look. I don't -- I don't doubt what they've said but I -- I don't recollect it right now.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. As to number 4, at this time -- and I'm not saying EEOC cannot come back depending on what they find but as of right now, I'm not going to grant 4. And you can double-check the privilege log -- EEOC, you can double-check the privilege log.

If you have a concern based on looking at that that maybe things have not been produced out of the in-house counsel's file, we can talk about that further at a -- at a different time, and depending on the information that you receive from the searches that are going to be conducted -- well, I'll just tell you, I have great concerns of doing a blanket search of in-house counsel of all of their files, and I realize that this goes beyond just these two defendants but I'm not ready to go there yet depending -- but -- now -- but what I will say is depending on what is found or discovered in any of the other searches that occur, then that may be something we have to talk about down the road but at this point I'm not -- I'm -- I'm going to deny 4 at this time.

All right. Number 5, and I think, Mr. Crainer, you already mentioned this or...

As I understand it, these items and messages that were on the RCD is -- the -- for lack of a better word, when somebody makes an entry and let's say the file goes to someone else or does something, that's the entry that is made but there's no document attached to it.

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Is that -- do I have a correct understanding of that?

MR. CRAINER: Exactly. Exactly, Judge. It's -- it's just an electronic fingerprint that just shows action being taken.

THE COURT: And I -- and I take it that the plaintiff is concerned of whether that's accurate or not and, therefore, within the 30(b)(6) you want to talk about it and find out?

MR. DOTY: Yes, Your Honor. Yeah. An example would be -- and -- and I -- I don't have a specific line that I can show you but one of the things they talk about is that, you know, the message on an item is -- is -- is just something that happens when someone logs onto the system and does something with that file, and yet, we found in one of the two that there were, like, 15 entry lines before that point meaning --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. DOTY: -- if -- if what they say is accurate, and, again, it's not under oath that we're getting these responses, these are responses for requests for production, and we'd like to have someone who's an expert that we can put under oath and ask. If that's the case, then why -- why wasn't an

1 item created, you know, 15 entries ago when the first action was taken. So there -- there's just questions. 2 3 And we're not asking the Court to resolve those questions. We just need the correct place to do that if -- not in sort of, 4 you know, dueling position statements --5 6 THE COURT: Right. MR. DOTY: -- with the Court. Let's -- let's --7 let's depose the expert who can tell us that, yeah --8 9 THE COURT: Does Werner have a --10 MR. DOTY: -- (indiscernible). 11 THE COURT: -- problem with that? 12 MR. CRAINER: Yes, Judge. We -- we have no general 1.3 issue with the subject matter being discussed. We just haven't received a 30(b)(6) notice -- a 30(b)(6) notice that -- that 14 15 designates the topics. 16 THE COURT: Okay. Which then goes into -- so based 17 on everything that's happened, I think 5 and that request to do 18 that would be appropriate to find out whether there's 19 documents, not documents and kind of what all of that means. 20 But then 6 goes back to their original 30(b)(6) topics 21 which when we discussed this back in, I believe, April, I was 2.2 concerned whether all of those items were relevant and some may 23 not have been, and, again, it was a situation we didn't know

So now that we know that, it's my understanding that you

kind of what and how the searches were conducted.

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have cut this down to basically five topics which is items 6, 7 and 8 and then -- so 6, charging parties' applications to defendant's employment, defendant's communications with charging parties. Is that -- am I on the right document?

MR. DOTY: Yes -- yes, Your Honor, you are.

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THE COURT: Okay. And then defendant's refusal to hire the charging party. So 6, 7 and 8 and then 39 and 40.

So does Werner have any problem with the 30(b)(6) on those five topics plus the RCD and talking about that and what those messages -- whether there's documentation along the lines with those messages and what those items and messages mean?

MR. CRAINER: Certainly, Judge. With -- with regard to the topics that are being identified or reidentified in the 30(b)(6), 6, 7, 8, 39 and 40, those were already explored in the prior 30(b)(6) depositions with documents that were already produced that, you know, provided the information that the audit trail data already shows, and the audit trail data, which is being used as a springboard to -- to review these topics, the audit trail data doesn't speak to Deuschle's and Robinson's application and -- and refusing to hire them and those tacks.

I mean, there's -- there's -- there's no relation between what is shown in the audit trail data and -- and what's being reexplored again that has already been taken care of in a 30(b)(6) deposition.

I mean, there were I think upwards of -- of -- of 12 hours

of -- of 30(b)(6) deposition or -- or just depositions on these topics already.

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THE COURT: Well, as to 6, 7 and 8, have -- has there been a 30(b)(6) in regards to those already and, if so, why do you want to do it again?

MR. DOTY: Well, Your Honor, the issue is that we now have the audit trail data. For example, in the 30(b)(6) deposition, we asked Miss Maus, who was one of their designees, and we asked Mr. Hollenbeck, who was the other designee, about, you know, their -- just for example their particular role in -- in analyzing the application or their communications.

Miss Maus talked to Mr. Robinson. There would be the communication. And they -- they gave us their answers. But had we had the routing comment document, we could have then said, well, you have this extra entry where you didn't talk about the day -- the next day when you did something on the file, and we -- how -- you know, 12 hours -- the problem is -- they're absolutely right.

We did 12 hours of depositions that frankly were a waste of time because they didn't give us the documents that we could have used to make it very efficient in saying, okay, great, you talked to Mr. Deuschle on this day, why did you take this action the following day, and -- and now they're basically saying, well, you've explored it, I know you didn't have all the data when you did explore it, but your time's up.

And so these five topics are all precisely on topic with what their routing -- routing comment document provides.

MS. CULHANE: Judge, this is Liz Culhane.

MR. DOTY: Every one of them.

MS. CULHANE: I apologize. Judge, could I respond real briefly? This is Liz Culhane.

THE COURT: You may.

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MS. CULHANE: Thank you.

Judge, for example, topic number 6 that Mr. Doty has identified as one he wants to redo talks about the applications -- Werner's applications that were filled out by Mr. Deuschle and Mr. Robinson. We do not understand how anything that is contained in these couple hundred lines of audit trail data which comprises in total 16 pages, the vast majority of which is -- occurred after this as redacted just entries, you know, like updated to server, you know. We don't understand how anything in the audit trail data bears on the contents of Werner's written applications, topic 6, okay?

Topics 39 or 40 talks about Werner's retention policies for its HR -- I think it's HR documents like applications. We don't understand how anything in the contents of the audit trail data, which just shows who touched Mr. Deuschle's online file and when, bears on the retention policies for Werner's HR department.

So other than the fact that he's -- he said that he can go

line by line through the audit trail data and say, you know, why was Mr. Deuschle's application uploaded to Werner's internal server at this date, we don't understand how the contents of that data actually bears on the topics that he's identified, all of which were already the subject of a deposition.

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And -- and to Mis- -- you know, it's kind of incredible to me that a deposition that is 12 hours long, now Mr. Doty takes the position that that was worthless based on a -- a couple of pages of data that was produced later when as we talked about at the last hearing, the vast majority of the information in that document and almost all the people identified in there other than a few admins were identified before those depos were taken and -- and were discussed at length with the Werner witnesses.

So we do not agree that the deposition topics that he's identified have -- have any relation to the audit trail data and require the Court to reopen testimony on those topics.

MR. DOTY: Yes. Look at 39. The topic is the systems that Defendants use to create, duplicate, maintain and store information on their applicants and employees including search capabilities. That is the audit trail data.

We couldn't even ask them a question about it. I mean, how do they track it? Well, the answer we now know is they have this audit trail data that lists specifically what was

done during the entire application process. That's topic 39.

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And if we can't open that up again -- we -- we couldn't ask -- we didn't ask a single question about the audit trail data because we didn't know it existed. And 40, the retention policy for those documents.

And so one of the things that we've raised in that issue of the -- the -- the audit trail data is -- it says, you know, document uploaded. Okay. So we want to know where is that document uploaded and where could we as the EEOC point the -- Werner to -- to produce it, and if the answer is, well, yeah, you know, we actually upload it but we delete it after two years, that's the retention policy, and, again, we couldn't ask those questions 'cause we didn't have the audit trail data in front of us.

These are five very narrowly focused that put -- are exactly on point with the audit trail data.

THE COURT: And I -- I think you are entitled to do the 30(b)(6) on the audit trail data. I think you're entitled to that and 39 and 40 as it relates to that I think you should be able to do.

Now, my question, though, is coming back to 6, 7 and 8 explain to me how that would relate to the audit trail data.

MR. DOTY: Well, the audit trail data, Your Honor, says what individuals kind of touched the file and took certain actions.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. DOTY: And -- and throughout those documents include reference to Mr. Hollenbeck and Mrs. -- Miss Maus. They're -- they're referenced in -- in both of those routing comment documents for Robinson and Deuschle, and when we were asking them questions about what they did at their various times relative -- you know, it was a timeline.

I mean, you can see the audit trail data's a marvelous, useful timeline that not only guides what they did with this file and who touched it and who it was passed to and those are questions that we couldn't -- we couldn't ask.

And I think our first memo that we did back in April before this laid out a lot of our concerns that we -- we share. We share -- we didn't -- we didn't feel the need to sort of recite them again here today --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. DOTY: -- but I think 6, 7, 8 are -- are precisely on point 'cause the -- the audit trail data only takes from the time that they have the -- the timeline starts with the application and it ends with -- largely with their rejection, and then everything after that is -- has to do with the litigation and it's been redacted, but it -- it -- it covers the precise timeline of the application so there's -- there's 6 and 7 and 8. I mean, it says we sent an email to him on this particular day.

I mean, one of the things, if you recall, was that he was -- Mr. Deuschle was rejected at one point, and there was this question of he had sent to supplement his file a copy of his FMCSA exemption, and Werner has maintained throughout this entire thing that they never got it, we never got it, and it was sent certified mail, and Mr. Deuschle got a certified return that it was, in fact, received on or about I'm going to say May 10th. Mr. East can jump in.

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There are four entries on May 10th where Mr. Hollenbeck opened something, opened a document and then uploaded something, and you can see -- you can see exactly when he did it on May 10th, the day that -- that certified mail says they received it, and they have denied it and -- and he denied it in his deposition, if I recall correctly, and we should be able to say to him, you deny that you received anything from him, then what were you doing -- what were these four entries that you did on that exact same day. Then let's see what he says --

THE COURT: Ms. Culhane --

MR. DOTY: -- see what his answer is.

THE COURT: -- do you want to respond to that?

MS. CULHANE: Sure, Judge. A couple of things. One, I deposed Mr. Deuschle and -- and I asked him if he sent the waiver, and I showed him the documents that we received, and he admitted that he must not have sent the waiver to Werner so I would just say that for -- for the record.

1 But, two, I -- I still don't understand topic 6, charging 2 parties' applications to defendants for employment. I don't 3 understand how anything in the audit trail data bears upon the contents of the application. The applications say what they 4 say, the applications have been produced in this lawsuit years 5 6 ago. I don't see how topic 6 has anything to do with anything 7 that is in the audit trail data and I didn't -- I respectfully 8 9 didn't understand Mr. Doty to give an explanation specific to 10 that point.

With respect to number 7, which talks about communications with the charging parties, there have been emails that have been produced and our -- our witnesses were deposed about them extensively, including Ms. Maus and Mr. Hollenbeck were deposed about their communications with the charging parties.

Mr. Doty has not pointed to anything in the audit trail data that I understand that would add anything to that discussion.

MR. DOTY: I just --

MS. CULHANE: (Indiscernible) --

MR. DOTY: -- (indiscernible) --

THE COURT: Hold on. Hold on. One at a time.

MR. DOTY: Okay.

THE COURT: Let her finish.

Go ahead.

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MS. CULHANE: Thank you.

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The -- Topic number 8 talks about Werner's refusal to hire the charging parties, including the reasons for those decisions. There's nothing about the reasons for Werner's decisions that I've seen in the audit trail data and our witnesses were subjected to numerous hours of deposition on that topic.

To the extent he -- he's citing the fact that it has to do with the identity of individuals who played a role in making, reviewing or supporting that decision, all of those individuals were identified long before the depositions. The only people who were in the audit trail data that were not identified until the audit trail data came up were essentially admin, I mean, people who did things like upload documents to the system.

So I don't think that that warrants reopening a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition to address that topic based on a few, couple lines of data when our people have sat for hours of depositions on those topics.

THE COURT: Mr. --

MR. EAST: Judge, this is Brian East for the intervenor. I just wanted to correct one point. Mr. Deuschle is clear that he sent a document that referenced his waiver, his FMCSA waiver, to Werner by certified mail and so it's misleading to suggest that he didn't send it to them.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Doty, did you want to say

something?

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MR. DOTY: No. I was just going to say but, you know, that's the communication with them, and I think had we had that document at the 30(b)(6) deposition, we could have challenged Mr. Hollenbeck's credibility, his motive. You know, why -- why would you say that you didn't get it when, in fact, you did something here on May 10th.

THE COURT: Well, here's -- here's the issue and I guess how I see this and am going to rule. There's no question that the plaintiff and intervenor did not have this document at the time of the depositions and they should have. So if there are questions that relate to that document with the witnesses, then they're going to be entitled to retake the deposition as it relates to that. This is not an opening to rehash other issues.

So what that means is -- and I understand, Ms. Culhane, potentially what you are saying in that, okay, number 6, charging parties' application to defendants for employment.

I -- so the question is, now, the data trail document very well may show that these different parties dealt with it and it went through this -- this channel and you can see it through the data trail document -- am I saying -- yeah -- or the audit trail document to show that that's what occurred, and if that's in the data trail document, then they're entitled to ask questions on that.

Now, Defendant's communication with charging parties, depends on what you mean by communication and if there's information in the -- in the -- the audit trail document that is different or in addition to what has already been testified to as to the communication and how that was done, then they're entitled to talk about that and do depositions of individuals in regards to that.

Now, Defendant's refusal to hire the charging parties. I don't think the audit trail documents have anything to do with that and, Mr. Doty, you can correct me if I'm wrong but I don't know how they would, quite honestly, includ- --

MR. DOTY: Well, Judge --

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THE COURT: -- including the reasons for the decision. None of that's in the audit trail, right? I mean, now, there may be a document that was sent in regards to that and that's fine, I think you can talk about that but the reason -- the reason for not hiring is not going to be in the audit trail.

MR. DOTY: Well, except -- so, Your Honor, it -it's -- it's sort of the Sherlock Holmes the dog that doesn't
bark. I mean, their position from the EEOC's investigation on
forward has been that they didn't hire Andrew Deuschle -- use
him as an example -- is because he did not attend a -- a
Werner-approved truck driving school, and Mr. East can correct
me if I'm wrong here.

So that position was because he didn't attend the Werner-approved truck driving school, we didn't hire him. That was one of our reasons. Well, what the audit trail data says very clear is -- is that -- and, again, I'm not looking at the date but there's a date that it says they change -- they -- they recognized they made a mistake and then changed the -- the school code for his school, and we should be able to ask them about that.

The other thing they said is, well, he didn't -Well, Brian, do you -- do you want to chime in about what
the audit -- you probably have a better understanding of it.

MR. EAST: No. Go ahead, Grant. I -- I don't.

I'll defer to you.

MR. DOTY: Yeah, so --

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MR. EAST: I (indiscernible) more about the school codes.

MR. DOTY: Yeah. So one is the school code and then the second thing is, is that they said that Mr. Deuschle wrongly applied for a -- what's -- what's -- what would be the intermediate truck driving position, not a new truck driver and not an experienced truck driver but sort of the middle level truck driving position.

And because he wasn't qualified, he hadn't driven six months, he really should have been applying for the new truck driver training position, and there's an audit trail data entry

for Mr. Hollenbeck where he says, I'm passing this one to you because he's really not a -- a middle truck driver, he's -- he's a -- he's a -- a trainee. That's where he -- he's going to come as a trainee.

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So they didn't reject him because of that. They did the right thing which is they moved him to the other category and so their claim from the EEOC investigation that he applied for the wrong position and wasn't qualified is pretext.

And so even though it doesn't say we rejected him for this reason, we know what they claim to be their rejection and we would have been able to ask them, If you claimed it was that, why did you, in fact, pass it on to Miss So-and-so to say it's a trainee position. So completely relevant and I think the audit trail data is spot on.

MS. CULHANE: Judge, can I respond briefly?

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. CULHANE: On the school issue, I -- I -- I take issue with Mr. Doty's summary of what's been alleged in this lawsuit. Back at the time of the EEOC investigation, when the initial response was prepared, in-house counsel was provided with some incorrect information about the school code and provided that information to EEOC and thereafter clarified in writing to the EEOC that that was not a reason and she had provided incorrect information.

So the school code is, in my view, a red herring. It was

a mistake that was made by -- by in-house counsel a long time ago back before this went to suit and it was -- and the EEOC was advised of that mistake a long time ago before this went to suit.

With respect to the issue about his experience, I mean, all of this stuff was already discussed. There was lengthy depositions taken on the issue of his experience and what experience you have to have to be a student driver versus a qualified driver. I mean, all these issues that Mr. Doty is bringing up as the alleged pretext were debated ad infinitum with our witnesses during over 12 hours of depositions in January, and to me, redoing those topics based on a few lines of data, the vast majority of which say things like driver item merged to system, don't have anything to do with these topics, and -- and it just seems like this is an attempt to redo a lot of work that's already been done here.

So from my perspective --

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MR. DOTY: Your Honor --

MS. CULHANE: -- Your Honor was exactly correct. The topic 8, our decision -- the decisions made by Werner with respect to their applications, the -- the audit trail data doesn't speak to that and there's no point in redoing deposition topics on those.

MR. DOTY: Your Honor, I'm not -- I'm not (indiscernible) the second point where Ms. Culhane commented

that we discussed the issue ad infinitum regarding the -the -- the job that he applied for.

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What she didn't deny was they did claim that that was one of the reasons why he was not hired, and the depositions would have been a lot better had he denied -- had Mr. Hollenbeck denied, for example, that that was why, and then we could point to that particular line and say but yet on this day, didn't you transfer the file with the guidance that he is, in fact, applying for a driver trainee position, and -- and -- and I think he would have stood there in stunned silence, and that would be an incredible video moment in front of a jury, and you can't -- the Court -- and we don't believe should deny that opportunity to us.

MS. CULHANE: Judge, what we've said in this case is that both of these drivers would have been required to go through Werner's student driver program and Werner did not believe that it could safely train the drivers in the student driver program because there's no way for them to keep their eyes on the road while simultaneously communicating with their driver trainer. That's what we've said about why we didn't hire these drivers.

And so the audit trail data doesn't speak to that and it's not going to provide additional information about the decision.

I mean, that's what we've said in this lawsuit. That's -that's Werner's position.

THE COURT: Okay.

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2 MR. DOTY: That's the position --

MS. CULHANE: It's about safety. And I don't understand how the audit trail data speaks to that issue.

MR. DOTY: That's the position now, Your Honor, but Mr. East [sic], that's not why he was not hired. He was not hired because they said they couldn't train him. He was not hired because they said he applied for the wrong job and he went to the wrong school, end -- end of argument. That is their position.

The second issue, whether they're willing to hire deaf drivers, go to the injunctive element of the EEOC's claim which we think is important but that's not relevant to Mr. Deuschle's harm and Mr. Deuschle's discrimination.

And the audit trail data specifically shows a -- a point that runs absolutely counter to what they claim throughout the entire lawsuit.

THE COURT: Well, and here's the issue. I mean, obviously, the defendant cannot dictate what questions and how the plaintiff wants to get their evidence or proves their case, and the problem that we have here is there is information that had the plaintiffs had it at the time of the deposition, they would have questioned on it.

So I will -- I'm going to allow the 30(b)(6) on those topics, on 6, 7, 8, 39 and 40, as well as on the RCD documents

that we talked about which is in number 5 but I want to be clear. I -- This is not reopening all of -- so all of questioning obviously in this case.

It -- it -- So what I would foresee is that this is not going to be very lengthy because it has to deal with the audit trail data and what that data shows in relationship to either what -- what they've already previously testified to 'cause what I'm hearing is they've testified to this and now we've got this audit trail data and it's showing something different or you have a question in regards to what's on the audit trail.

I guess what I'm trying to say is it needs to focus on that 'cause it is not this Court's intention to reopen a deposition to talk about anything and everything in relation to 6, 7 and 8. It has to be in relationship to the audit trail data.

Understand? Makes sense?

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MR. DOTY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So then 7 has to do with extending the motion to compel deadline to October 24th which I will tell you makes sense due to the other orders of the Court today.

So I guess the question I have is in requiring Werner to do searches of these other items and the databases but I think we need to know what the databases are to determine what needs to be searched, how long -- how long do you think it would take

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      Werner to put together the databases and what they are?
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                MR. CRAINER: Judge, I'm -- Brandon Crainer here.
      I'm not sure how long that would take. I -- I know there's 400
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      databases and it's not clear from the title so I -- I would
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      have to confer with our IT people.
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                THE COURT: Well -- and that's fine.
                                                       What -- what I
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      will do is I'm going to extend the motion to compel till
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      October 24th but will extend that further if -- obviously I
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      want this done by Werner in quick order 'cause this case needs
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      to keep moving, but obviously if there's a -- a issue, then you
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      can let the Court know and I can extend that date if we need to
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      do that further.
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                MS. CULHANE: Judge, can I just --
                THE COURT: Yeah.
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                MS. CULHANE: -- can I just speak real quickly on
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      that issue?
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                THE COURT: On which issue?
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                MS. CULHANE: This is Liz -- I'm sorry, on the
      October 24th date.
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                THE COURT: Sure.
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                MS. CULHANE: Judge, this is Liz Culhane.
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                THE COURT: Yeah.
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                MS. CULHANE: Yeah, I just wanted to just raise two
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      issues. First, the EEOC's position statement states that at
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      the last hearing the Court extended only their deadline for
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discovery but that's not correct.

The Court extended both parties' deadlines for the discovery deadline, the deposition deadline and the motion to compel deadline, and the reason the Court did so is you recognized that because they are going to delay other fact depositions until they complete what they believe is the additional document search that both parties may have issues that come up during the later fact depositions that require additional discovery.

And -- and --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. CULHANE: -- we already had that discussion back in April. And so from our perspective this request to extend one party's deadline, it should be a mutual deadline because I think they're still asking the same thing. I mean, they want to delay all the fact depositions until -- there -- there's other fact witnesses --

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. CULHANE: -- that they want to delay till they finish this new 30(b)(6). That's one point.

The only other thing I would ask, Judge, is that we are in a two-week trial in October, including through the week of October 24th --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. CULHANE: -- so if the Court is inclined to grant

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that extension, we would ask you to push it out another month because we're going to have a couple weeks in there where we're not going to be able to be doing depositions in this case and I note that he's asked for an extension of the discovery deadline to be on that date as well.

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My concern is we're going to get a flurry of requests to -- for depositions in this case during the last two weeks of the discovery deadline which is what happened last time. In May I think they noticed eight depositions to occur over a 12-day period right up to the last date.

I wouldn't be able to do that if the Court puts the deadline on October 24th because we are in a two-week trial in another case. So I would just ask the Court to consider putting it toward the end of November to account for that trial schedule issue and to make the deadlines mutual for the same reasons you did last time.

THE COURT: Any objection to that, Mr. Doty?

MR. DOTY: I don't object, Your Honor, to the, you know, further, you know, extension out a month. I think that's great 'cause I -- I don't want to be pushing against their trial. I mean, I think our -- my understanding from the April one was we didn't want -- and I don't believe the Court wanted -- Werner to benefit from something that was caused by them but I do understand that the depositions that we're going to be doing, both parties should go out until that date.

THE COURT: All right. So I'll -- I will extend everything to November 30th.

MS. CULHANE: Thank you, Judge.

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THE COURT: So, yeah, the discovery deadlines will be extended until then, including the motion to compel deadline.

So -- all right. So that takes care of the EEOC's issues.

So moving then to the -- Werner's two issues, first, the subpoena of Dr. Tricia Lynn which -- and I guess I need to clarify because Werner's submission indicates that they limited the request for information from that doctor as to Robinson's treatment for high blood pressure only, and the EEOC's submission seems to indicate that it was not limited unless I read that wrong.

MS. CULHANE: This is Liz --

MR. CRAINER: Judge, allow me --

MS. CULHANE: Go ahead, Brandon.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CRAINER: I'm sorry. I'm sorry. This is -- this is Brandon Crainer on for Dr. Wright. Our -- our subpoena -- and I don't have it in front of me, unfortunately, but I -- I believe our subpoena was -- was asking for all of his treatment records but, again, I don't have that in front of me but -- so here -- here's the thing, though, about the subpoena to Dr. Wright and the reason why we're seeking it and -- and the reason why we think we should be allowed to serve the subpoena.

So Mr. Robinson testified under oath that his high blood pressure worsened due to his interactions with Werner.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. CRAINER: That was alleged in the complaint by the EEOC and that was also asserted in an interrogatory answer. When we requested the medical records relating to his -- his -- his treatment there, after some discussion they stated they would withdraw that claim so in their opinion and their view, the -- the records are no longer relevant.

I don't necessarily know what they mean by withdrawing the claim because there was no specific claim as to -- to blood pressure. He gave that testimony when we asked him under oath to describe the damages that he suffered as a result of his interactions with Werner, but withdrawing it and ignoring the testimony is -- is certainly not sufficient.

Now after we've received that testimony under oath and are following and -- and checking on it, the EEOC responded, look, we just won't have him testify about it so there you go, don't need the records. And incredibly in a footnote that Mr. Doty put in his position statement was that truthfulness is a collateral matter and -- and we most certainly disagree with that. Truthfulness is -- is at the heart of -- of -- of the case and Mr. Robinson's testimony.

The jury, as you know, will be instructed to consider the credibility of the witness in -- in ruling on the EEOC's

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      claims. So in our view, the records from Dr. Wright are
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      directly relevant to what Mr. Robinson did under oath, that his
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      high blood pressure condition worsened as a result of his
      interaction with Werner, and we should be investigated
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      to permit -- we should be permitted to investigate those
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      allegations.
           If the records tend to show it -- tend to show that his
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      testimony on that point is untrue, then that goes directly to
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      the heart of this lawsuit because it calls into question his
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      testimony about his alleged damages. So that is why we are
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      seeking the subpoena to Dr. Wright.
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                THE COURT: But you're willing to limit that just to
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      his high blood pressure, correct?
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                MR. CRAINER: Yes.
                                     Yes.
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                THE COURT: Okay.
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                MR. CRAINER: Yes, Judge.
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                THE COURT: All right. Mr. Doty.
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                MS. BERWICK: Your Honor, this is Meredith Berwick.
      I've been handling this issue --
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                THE COURT: Yes.
                MS. BERWICK: -- with Mr. Crainer.
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           So that is a new position of Defendant's that they would
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      limit it to high blood pressure, and, again, we reassert our
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      offer to withdraw the claim related to his high blood pressure.
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If he does not present evidence related to his high blood

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pressure, then it is a collateral matter to the case.

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They're not claiming that -- you know, that it was an issue with his application. You know, for instance, when he went in for his DOT physical or the FMCSA information, that was collected. They're only claiming that he's a liar because he has a damage that he presented and now when his privacy, you know, is at issue in order to prove that damage, he would prefer to maintain his privacy and his medical records, you know, similar -- I've had clients who, you know, claimed they lost their car but then when it, you know, turned out they were going to have to give up some of their financial information to the other side as part of that, they have chosen to withdraw the claim, and the defendant hasn't pursued it.

And ordinarily defendants are happy when we say, you know, here's a damage that we thought we had but we're not going to pursue it any further in the interests of our client's privacy. If they had anything else regarding his veracity in the medical records that they've already received through the employers, they — they would have pointed it out.

So I'm still perplexed as to why the plaintiff's removal of this claim of damages regarding his high blood pressure would not resolve this issue.

MR. CRAINER: Judge, and -- and what I'll say is just a quick response to that. This goes directly to his credibility. Truthfulness is not a collateral matter here so

I -- I would say that we -- we should have the -- the subpoena issued so that we could obtain that as to high blood pressure records in -- in order that -- that are relevant to his claim of damages.

THE COURT: All right. As to that issue, because he has testified under oath to that issue, I am going to allow the subpoena for medical records relating to his blood pressure only.

MR. CRAINER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Move --

MS. BERWICK: Okay.

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THE COURT: Sorry. Did somebody want to say something?

MS. BERWICK: Oh, no.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. BERWICK: Just thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And then moving on to B, which is the authorization for release of the Aspire Indian -- Indiana Health records, and as I understand it, there was a subpoena which nobody objected to and then under state law there needs to be a release and that there were conversations between the parties and that EEOC was trying to get -- get Mr. Robinson to sign the release, that did not happen, and I don't know that there was anything else argued or talked about in regards to that, but obviously this has now been brought to

the Court's attention, and what I mean by that is the

plaintiffs indicate that they do have a concern with the

release because it is saying it should go until 60 days after

termination of their services versus the litigation.

And I -- so I don't know if the EEOC has -- or, excuse me,

if Werner has any issue with limiting the release to when this

litigation is either -- is decided either based on -- on motion

MS. CULHANE: Your Honor --

if -- and if so, if that solves the issue.

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MR. CRAINER: Judge, yes -- so -- I'm sorry. Real -- real quick, Judge, on the -- on the subpoena to Aspire. We just want a release that's going to allow us to get the records. We did just receive an email at the last minute from counsel --

or a trial till there's a resolution limiting it to that, and

MS. CULHANE: Last month or --

MR. CRAINER: -- yesterday with -- with the release --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CRAINER: -- that they suggested changing. The issue why we brought this forward and -- and the issue that I took with their position statement is that they're starting to raise objections and trying to limit what the subpoena is seeking when they never even had any objections --

THE COURT: Right.

1 MR. CRAINER: -- at the outset. 2 Back in April counsel said, look, we have no objection 3 and -- and now after the fact they're -- they're trying to limit what we're going to obtain. It's kind of like the -- the 4 same issue that we had last time when we were seeking to 5 6 subpoena the FMCSA. 7 MS. CULHANE: Right. Your Honor, if I may, what Brandon 8 MS. BERWICK: 9 isn't telling you is that the release I sent last night does 10 not limit the documents sent in any regard. 11 MR. CRAINER: No. And -- and --12 MS. BERWICK: It just stated --13 MR. CRAINER: -- and I -- I --14 MS. BERWICK: -- (indiscernible). 15 MR. CRAINER: -- I was certainly getting there, 16 Judge, so thank you. 17 But what I'm saying is that we're -- we will take the 18 release however we can get it. What I would ask, though, is 19 that -- as I've stated in our letter to the Court -- just that 20 it be signed within five days and provided within seven days 21 thereafter so that we can have it as soon as possible and that 2.2 we can -- that we can issue it. 23 THE COURT: Okay. So are you fine with the release 24 as you have it now? 25 MS. BERWICK: With the copy of the release --

1 MR. CRAINER: I don't --2 MS. BERWICK: -- that I sent them last night, we are 3 okay with that. THE COURT: Right. But I'm asking Mr. Crainer if 4 he's okay with it. 5 6 MS. BERWICK: Sorry. MR. CRAINER: Other -- other than the fact it's not 7 8 signed but yes, yes. I'm fine. 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. CRAINER: I don't think there's any -- anything 11 else that needs to be changed. It needs to be signed. 12 THE COURT: All right. So, Miss Berwick, can you get 13 that signed by Mr. Robinson within five days and back to 14 counsel within seven days? 15 MS. BERWICK: Yeah, that shouldn't be a problem. 16 the defendants -- can it be ordered that the defendants provide 17 us the documents they receive within, say, ten days of 18 receiving them? 19 THE COURT: Any objection? 20 MR. CRAINER: That's fine, Judge. 21 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Defendant will within 2.2 ten days provide records to Plaintiff. 23 Okay. All right. I think that takes care of all of the 24 issues today. So I will enter an order based on what we talked

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about today.

1	Is there anything else, Mr. Doty, from you today?
2	MR. DOTY: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
3	THE COURT: Anything else on beha Mr. East, on
4	behalf of the intervenor?
5	MR. EAST: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
6	THE COURT: All right. Anything further from Werner
7	Enterprises?
8	MR. CRAINER: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
9	THE COURT: All right. Thank you, everybody. I'll
10	go off the record.
11	(Adjourned at 2:33 p.m.)
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13	* * * * *
14	
15	I, Rogene S. Schroder, certify that the foregoing is a
16	correct transcription to the best of my ability from the
17	digital recording of the proceedings held in the above-entitled
18	matter.
19	/s/Rogene S. Schroder October 22, 2021
20	Transcriber Date
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